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SOME OLD FASHIONED NOTIONS ABOUT LEGAL
EDUCATION ACCOMPANIED BY SOME
ULTRA-CONSERVATIVE SUGGESTIONS
By LEWIS D. ASPER*
We have fooled ourselves, we have fooled our law professors, we
have fooled the whole bewildered public, into the idea that the
essence of our craft lies in our knowledge of the law. And knowledge of the law we do have, and we do need, but such knowledge
is but the precondition of our work.
Let me say it again: the essence of our craftsmanshiplies in skills,
and wisdoms; in practical, effective, persuasive, inventive skills
for getting things done, any kind of thing in any field; in wisdom
and judgment in selecting the things to get done; in skills for
moving men into desired action, any kind of man, in any field;
and then in skills for regularizing the results, for building into
controlled large-scale action such doing of things and such moving
of men.
But we do not say this, even to ourselves. Why not? Does it
seem too plain, too ordinary, too much like what needs no license
via bar examination? I do not know. What I do know is that
because we do not say it to ourselves we do not study our own
essence as we need to, we do not train every lawyer in it, we do
not have and cannot yet phrase or apply standards of minimum
competence in it, we do not require entrants to qualify in it, we
learn it, each one of us, only by slow unreckonable accident,
happenstance or inborn artistry.**
I.
Lawyers in more than twenty states now have available to them
regular, organized continuing legal education programs, joint efforts,
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; former Director,

Committee on Continuing Education of the Bar of the Maryland State Bar Association; Member of the Second National Conference on the Continuing Education of the
Bar, December, 1963. The views and proposals herein are solely and exclusively those
of the writer, and do not represent the position of the University of Maryland School
of Law. As far as his faculty colleagues are concerned, the writer is reasonably sure
that some or all of them not only will not concur, but may regard the whole thing
as outrageous.
S**Llewellyn, The Crafts of the Law Re-Valued, 15 RocKy MT. L. Rtv. 1,
2-4 (1942).
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in most cases, of bar associations and local law schools. Almost all
of these programs include as a regular feature courses for newly
admitted lawyers designed to "bridge the gap" between legal education
and the practice of law. These latter programs were among the major
topics under discussion at the Second National Conference on Continuing Education of the Bar at Columbia University's Arden House
in December, 1963. The final statement of the Conference, published
in 1964,1 reported the conclusion of this group of seventy-seven practicing lawyers, judges, law teachers and professional continuing legal
education administrators that such a "gap" does exist, that there is
an insistent need to fill it and that apprenticeship or clerkship programs
have proved generally unsatisfactory for the purpose.
The gap is identified as the absence of training in the practical
skills of the profession, training which the Conference suggest is "not
appropriate for inclusion in law school education." 2 The Conference
recommended the organization of programs providing concentrated
and comprehensive training in skills which would follow graduation
from law school and precede entry into the profession. The Statement suggests, at least, that consideration be given to making successful
3
completion of such a course a condition of admission to practice.
The mere fact that a strong demand has arisen for such additional
training for lawyers should be of significance to both law teachers and
the practicing bar. Painful though it is for a full-time teacher to
admit, the demand indicates that something valuable was lost when
formal legal education supplanted "reading law" or other forms of onthe-job training. Call it skill or by some other name, it is missed.
Moreover, half-way measures - most particularly the required clerkships imposed on candidates in some states - have not worked. They
are a burden on candidates without even roughly corresponding benefits to the profession. While in theory they should supply this elusive
skill factor, the facts of contemporary law practice appear to be such
that the training supplied during clerkships is narrow, limited, sometimes almost non-existent.' Beyond that, it should be noted that what
is true of pre-admission clerkships is true in greater or less degree of
many other forms of auxiliary legal training available to law students
and recent graduates. Clerkships to judges, for example, are plums
for recent graduates and properly so because of the experience and
training they provide. Extended clerkships, however, and prolonged
careers as bailiffs may well become cumulative and repetitious, diminishing in training value as the student or graduate concentrates repeatedly
1. NATIONAL CONI'ERENC9 ON THZ CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, TOWARD
EXCnLLENCE IN CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (1964) (hereinafter cited as NATIONAL
CONFERENCE).

2. Final Statement of the Second National Conference on the Continuing Education of the Bar, 32 U.S.L. WESK 2307 (Dec. 24, 1963).

3. Ibid.

4. A Committee appointed by the New Jersey Supreme Court to study the
required clerkship system in that state found that:

1. No uniform standards of skills were available to all clerks.

2. No real standards existed for governing the teaching and employment relationship between preceptor and clerk.
3. The economic burden of clerkship was placed on those least able to afford
it - the beginning lawyers.

Jarmel, The New Jersey Skills Training Course, 17 J. LzoAL ED. 432 (1965).
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and continuously on one corner of the legal process. A fortiori part
time student employment in busy law offices.
Only a minority of the Arden House conferees could claim any
experience with the kind of program recommended. The models
offered for examination and discussion included the elaborate program
offered in Toronto,5 the 10 week course which has long been in operation in Wisconsin6 and the plans for the 12 week course offered in
New Jersey for the first time during the summer of 1964. 7 Even
with these models to work from the Conference had neither time nor
facilities to draw up a curriculum or make definitive suggestions on
methods to be used. All the Conference did, in the last analysis, was
express agreement on the need. There was almost unanimous agreement among the lawyers, judges and teachers present that there is a
big hole in the training of young lawyers resulting from the absence
of carefully planned and supervised exercises in doing what lawyers
do rather than merely examining the consequences of what some
lawyer has done.
The Conference statement is significant in one other respect. It is
addressed to the profession and, therefore, takes the position that it
is the duty of the organized bar to take steps to correct deficiencies in
the training of young lawyers. By necessary implication it charges
the profession with responsibility for the competence of all of its
initiates and is a disavowal of the position that lawyers need only
concern themselves with the competence and professional standards of
their own employees and associates.'
Implicit in this position is
recognition of what all know to be true: That in any jurisdiction there
5. For admission to the bar in Ontario, in addition to obtaining an LL.B. from
an approved law school, the candidate must complete 12 months of apprenticeship with
a solicitor practicing in the province and a six month teaching period that commences
immediately upon completion of his apprenticeship. The faculty of this extended course
is made up principally of lawyers but also includes judges, social workers, police,
government officials, psychiatrists, newspapermen and accountants. Roberts, The Bar
Admission Course in Ontario, Canada, NATIONAL CONFERENCE, op. cit. supra note 1,
Appendix D (1964).
6. The State of Wisconsin admits graduates of state law schools to practice
without a bar examination. The State University law school, however, requires its
graduates either to clerk for six months or to complete successfully a 10 week summer
course in what are conceived to be the elementary skills of the general practitioner.
The course is taught by law teachers, lawyers, judges and representatives of various
government agencies. Jarmel, Special Educational Needs of the Newly Admitted
Lawyer 25 (mimeo), Working Paper for Second National Conference on the Continuing Education of the Bar.
7. The State of New Jersey offered a 12 week skills course as an alternative to
the required six month clerkship for the first time in the summer of 1964. The course
was a combination of skills, lectures, demonstrations and problems which followed
substantive review lectures in selected fields. The course was offered prior to bar
examinations, so that it was designed to serve as a bar review course as well as skills
training. Reportedly, this was not an entirely happy combination of objectives.
Jarmel, Report on the New Jersey Skills Training Course, NATIONAL CONF"RENzCE,
op. cit. supra note 1, Appendix E (1964).
8. A special concern of the Arden House Conference and of other interested
individuals is the young lawyer who leaves school and immediately goes into practice
on his own. It does not appear to be true that most law graduates enter into associations with older and experienced lawyers who bring them along slowly until they
are ready to fly alone. Professor Walter Gellhorn of Columbia University reports
that even in New York, with its concentration of large law firms, about seventy
percent of the lawyers engage in solo practice and set up that way not long after
graduation. Gellhorn, The Second and Third Years of Law Study, 17 J. LXGAL ED. 1,
13 (1964).
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is an inescapable reciprocity between the standards and quality of the
training young lawyers receive and the standards and quality of the
bar in which they take their positions.'
The idea is an exciting one. In moments of optimism one can see
a possibility that such programs might replace in substantial part the
ubiquitous, small-bore "bar review" courses, or even ultimately be
incorporated into the whole process of testing competence for the
profession. At their very best such courses might be an important step
toward the objective urged by Professor David F. Cavers of the
Harvard Law School 16 years ago, that of providing "continuity in
the processes of education between law school and law office," 10 and in
that respect help bridge the gap so often existing between law teachers
and practicing lawyers. There is reason to believe the Conference
Statement will receive careful and thoughtful attention in a number
of states. Organized continuing legal education activities have increased dramatically since the first Arden House Conference on the
subject in 1958. In most if not all states where such programs have
been given a reasonably full trial, bar associations are persuaded that
they are among the most significant services the associations can
offer. And as noted above, in almost all states where continuing legal
education has received careful study, the special needs of newly admitted
lawyers have come in for particular attention.
II.
The Conference Statement focuses on "areas of instruction centering in practical skills which are not appropriate for inclusion in law
school education" and adds, "Instruction in these areas should be pro'vided by the profession."" If this statement is taken too literally by law
teachers, there is a danger that the recommendation will be seriously
misunderstood. If it is read as acceptance of a clean distinction
between legal education and training in the "practical skills" of the
profession, then the promise of the proposed program will be seriously
diminished. Insistence on this distinction has in the past hindered
development of the "continuity in the processes of education" urged by
Professor Cavers. Continuing to insist upon it will discourage the
collaboration between experienced teachers and experienced practitioners that could mean so much to improvement in the training of
young lawyers.
It seems fair to say that the Arden House Statement lines up in
opposition to those who urge that law school time should be given to
how-to-do-it sessions calculated to familiarize students with what are
conceived to be the routines or techniques of practicing law.' 2 At the
same time it would be a mistake to regard the recommendation as an
9. The emphasis here is on the "reciprocity." While few deny that the standards
of the schools influence the standards of the bar, what is less commonly acknowledged
is that the attitude of the bar toward legal education can act as a governor on what
the schools can demand and get from students.
10. Cavers, "Skills" and Understanding, 1 J. LZOAL ED. 395, 402 (1949).
11. Final Statement of the Second National Conference on the Continuing Education of the Bar, 32 U.S.L. WtIK 2307 (Dec. 24, 1963).

12.

NATIONAL CONF9RZNCX,

op. cit. supra note 1, at 21 (1964).
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unqualified though indirect indorsement of law schools and the current
course of legal education; or to take it as evidence that the profession
supports the position that law schools have only a limited obligation
to see that graduates emerge with some measure of professional skill.
In the Arden House discussions, formal and informal, it quickly became
apparent that before the conferees could decide whether such additional
training was needed, it would have to be made clear just what such
training could be expected to do. It was important at Arden House
and it will be important in the future for all who are interested to
understand that a skills course is not a philosopher's stone that can
convert abstractions to working competence in two or three months.
Neither can a skills course provide the feel for the law and its ways
which is a part of the equipment of every good lawyer and is usually
the product of sound education plus experience. The Arden House
proposal contemplates training designed to instruct the young lawyer
in how to do a number of typical lawyer's jobs. Training him to
determine what job needs doing in any given situation remains the
function of formal legal education. Failure to insist on the distinction
is to misrepresent the proposed skills training and, incidentally, to
obscure certain facts about law school education.
Practicing lawyer members of the Conference had plenty to say
about the shortcomings of young lawyers, but most of the complaints
reflected not lack of skill but fundamental deficiencies in education.
There was less concern with the young lawyer's ignorance of matters
of particular detail than with the fact that he so often comes to the
profession with an incomplete, even faulty, conception of what is involved in "lawyering." It was said that the young lawyer frequently
has trouble identifying legal problems when they come at him in twos
and threes; that having identified and analyzed a problem, he is often
without any idea what to do about it. It was said that he often has
to be told, almost as if for the first time, that in a law office "seeing
the issue" is not enough - that clients want something done about
their problems and come to lawyers for the doing. If these complaints
are legitimate ones, it means young lawyers come out of law school
and into the profession without fully understanding what a lawyer
does for a living. In this regard they certainly lack something practical, something which is as much skill as it is knowledge. It is not,
however, a deficiency which can be corrected in a 10 week skills course.
Indeed, there is a serious question whether, absent real understanding
of the demands the profession will make, a concentrated course in
how to do certain jobs skillfully can be taught at all.
The Arden House proposal, then, contemplates only a short, concentrated post-graduate course designed to give the new lawyer familiarity with the places, the machinery, the forms, the tribunals he will
use and, as far as possible, with the shape and substance of the transactions most likely to be committed to his care during the early years
of his practice. The proposal suggests that the instruction should be
provided by practicing lawyers, and those who have had experience
with such courses add that the instruction should include exercises
with carefully prepared problems and not be confined to lectures. The
subject matter would be limited to the law of the jurisdiction and
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emphasis placed on doing what has to be done."3 It is vain to expect
that such an abbreviated program can devote much time to the critical
initial step of determining what should be done in a given case.
On the hopeful assumption that serious efforts will be made to
accomplish the Arden House recommendation, one may foresee even
more extensive benefits for legal education generally. The proposal
suggests expanding legal education, not making substitutions in what
is presently offered. With that as an objective an occasion is presented
for collaboration between law teachers and lawyer-tutors in planning
this expansion - collaboration in place of the periodic guerrilla warfare which in the past has forced representatives of both groups to
take positions they couldn't possibly defend if really put to it. It would
be a relief to have it settled once and for all that membership in a
learned and responsible profession should involve something more than
know-how 4 and, at the same time, eliminate the prissy notion that "the
law" is pure and serene while practice is something faintly disreputable
that lawyers do with it. 15
If skills or know-how training is to be consigned to a separate
and distinct phase of legal education, what is the full significance of
this development for the law schools? If the criticisms and comments
heard at Arden House are typical and legitimate, then it would seem
that the bar's objections are not always and necessarily directed to
emphasis on content at the expense of skill, but rather to what it conceives to be some fundamental deficiencies in the content itself. These
observations are not new. They have been heard, not only from practicing lawyers but from some of the ablest law teachers for a number
of years: Too large a proportion of law teaching encourages students
to see the law as a plane surface - flat, two-dimensional, presenting
but a single aspect. It is an old refrain: excessive reliance on appellate
reports as the only respectable teaching materials produces an idea
of the content of the law totally removed from any view a lawyer
would take in the ordinary practice of his profession. No one has
illustrated this better than Professor Cavers in his analysis of the
mythical case of Eks v. Wye.' 8 Without purporting to exhaust the
possibilities, he offered 17 different views of the case which might
at one time or another appear to a lawyer. In then considering which
or how many of these views would appear to a student reading the
report of the case in a casebook he concluded ruefully,
13. Id. at 25-27.
14.
Not only does the skills-and-techniques conception fail to furnish any intelligible guide for organizing legal education, but the attempt to apply it seriously
threatens to forfeit the most valuable feature of the American case method of
instruction, namely, an impersonal absorption in problems. It converts what ought
to be a disinterested exploration of issues into an exercise in self-improvement.
It abandons the university tradition in legal training for something that smacks
of Dale Carnegie or Charles Atlas.
Fuller, What the Law Schools Can Contribute to the Making of Lawyers, 1 J. LEGAL
ED. 189, 191 (1948).
15. Teachers are sometimes tempted to think that what they are communicating
to students is the eternal verities while what comes to the young lawyer in practice
is merely routine and sometimes tricky technique. At best, of course, this is only a
conclusion, and it may be pretentious nonsense. See, e.g., McClain, Legal Education:
Extent to Which "Know-How" in Practice Should Be Taught in Law Schools, 6 J.
LtGAL ED. 302 (1954).

16. Cavers, supra note 10, at 397.
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Probably the students will adopt none of these viewpoints. In all
likelihood the problem of significance will not occur to them, for
they will have only to decide what Eks v. Wye 'decided,' not what
should be done or not done in the light of that decision. They
are dealing with a question abstracted from actuality, in which no
one other than a law student would be interested except 7as a part
of some other question calling for decision and action.1
We teach a student to read and analyze a case (or even, in some
few cases, a statute), and come out with a "holding." But there, too
often, we leave him, with only the most fragmentary idea of what he
is going to do with this "holding" now that he's got it. Plainly, he is
not yet ready for training in how to use this bit of knowledge skillfully,
because he doesn't know what use he may be required to make of it.
In Professor Cavers' analysis, before there can be effective training for
skillfulness in the practice of a lawyer's skills, there must be understanding of the skills a lawyer must have.' 8 In broad outline, the whole
process of preparation for the legal profession involves at least three
elements: Knowledge,' 9 understanding of the jobs a lawyer must do
which will require use and application of that knowledge, and training
which will prepare a lawyer to do these jobs skillfully. Failure to distinguish the second and third of these elements has confounded discussion of legal education for years. Continued failure to do so will
seriously threaten the chances for success of the Arden House proposal.
Communication of knowledge and understanding of a lawyer's skills
must remain the function of the law schools. No skills course will have
the time or resources to undertake this part of the process, nor will it
be possible to give effective training in skillfulness except on a solid
base of understanding. Communication of knowledge we in the law
schools do reasonably well, too well, perhaps, to the extent we insist on
transmitting masses of detail that students can't possibly retain. Our
techniques for communicating understanding of lawyer skills need some
work, and there is a strong possibility that lack of understanding of
lawyer skills, not lack of skillfulness in lawyer skills, is the "gap" that
so many have been trying so hard to fill.
III.
When one considers the enormous variety of jobs lawyers are
called upon to do, he must at first despair of producing any curriculum
or plan which could provide "understanding" of all of this activity.
There is no single form of advocacy or counseling, no uniform technique of negotiating nor all-purpose style of draftsmanship. It is as
vain to try to teach understanding of skill by particular skill as it is
17. Id. at 399.
18. Id. at 396.
19.
The current preference for method over content should not blind us to the
fact that those who talk content often have something important to say. Methodism,
even in the non-ecclesiastical sense, can be carried to excess. There is need to
recall that the slogan, "We teach men to think," has been the last refuge of
every dying discipline from Latin and Greek to Mechanical Drawing and Common-Law Pleading.

Fuller, supra note 14, at 190.
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to try to stuff a student with all the knowledge he will need. There
are, however, certain fundamentals which are a part of the equipment
of every good lawyer. Training for the profession must involve getting
a grip on these fundamentals. The difficulty is that they defy definition or cataloging. The best law teachers, like the best lawyers, know
what they are and on occasion come close to describing them, almost
without trying. Witness the following by the late Karl N. Llewellyn:
Some students seem to me to be "whole"-seers or "whole"feelers - "situation"-minded. They feel patterns, they almost
automatically "correct" a concrete situation into comparison with
its appropriate working pattern, and come out with a quick sensitivity as to whether and where the concrete situation is typical
or non-typical, to which of the seen or felt factors in it tends to
dominance, to what the movement-"strain" is and whither that
strain leads or drives.
The more frequent type of student has to build his wholes more
slowly and on a lesser scale, has to work his way into them and
into feel for them, skill with them. He needs "rule" and "principle"
and skeleton and repeated, painful, experimental doing until he
slowly gets this or that skill organized and "worked into" him.2"
It is submitted that the "situation-sense" described in the first
quoted paragraph is something every good lawyer has - it may be
the sum of everything he has - and that providing law students with
the means of acquiring a "situation-sense" must be a conscious objective of legal education. The second quoted paragraph contains some
sound advice on how to go about it. The heart of the process is "repeated, painful, experimental doing"; but doing requires raw materials
and raw materials for a law student must include the rules, principles,
norms, concepts, prototypes which make up the content of the law.
We are interested in rules and principles then, in part at least, as
means and instruments of understanding and must ask, understanding
of what? To say understanding of "the law" will only start more arguments. It is safer and more productive to state as an objective of
legal education the directing of student efforts toward understanding
the function of a lawyer as "a participant, and usually the most active
and responsible participant, in two basic social processes: adjudication
and legislation," ' 21 the two fundamental processes through which we
try to adjust a staggeringly diverse assortment of competing interests.
Let us first recognize, and acknowledge as a defect in legal training,
that to many of our students adjudication and legislation mean simply
courts and congresses. Dimly perceived, if at all, is the understanding
found in Professor Fuller's descriptions which include, in the first of
these processes, "all forensic methods of deciding disputes," 22 and in
the second, "the lawyer in his rule-creating, structure-giving r6le."'2 1 If,
20. Llewellyn, McDougal and Lasswell Plan for Legal Education, 43 COLUM. L.

Rsv. 476, 478 (1943).
21. Fuller, supra note 14, at 192.
22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.
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indeed, adjudication includes not only all levels of litigation in courts
but also the functions of administrative tribunals and informal arbitration, and in addition, office counseling on prospects of lawsuits and
negotiation of settlements; and if legislation includes not only conceiving and drafting statutes, but also negotiating and drafting contracts, franchises and collective bargaining agreements, and in addition,
planning and drafting of wills, voting trusts and corporate charters,
then the student whose education has been disproportionately larded
with appellate reports has been exposed to the merest fragment of these
processes in which the lawyer plays such a vital part. More serious,
the advanced student who has more or less mastered law school technique may read his cases, even brief them, and reduce them "to propositions of law unlike Restatement blackletter only in the relative inaccuracy of their formulations"2 4 while enjoying only the slightest
intimations of the situations which produced the occasion for exercise
of the adjudicative machinery. He is in the curious position of having
answers for what are, for him, as yet undetermined questions.
An illustration may help clarify what is here meant by "understanding" - in this instance, understanding of adjudication as a social
process for the adjustment of competing interests - and also provide
a basis for judging whether this kind of understanding is being offered
to law students. In February, 1965, in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons,
Inc.,25 the New Jersey Supreme Court departed from the "traditional
rule" that warranties in the sale of real estate are not to be implied and
held liable for negligence and breach of implied warranty the builder
and seller of a development house who installed a water heater without a heat control unit, though he knew of the danger thus created.
The Court's authority, if that's what it was, for this change of direction was Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 26 New Jersey's allpurpose contribution to the jurisprudence of product liability. It seems
fair to say of counsel for plaintiff Schipper that he was one who understood that the "traditional rule" was an adjudicator's response to a
situation with certain distinct characteristics, a choice between identifiable competing interests; and that the situation with which he was
confronted presented different characteristics, offered a choice between
different competing interests and, therefore, might well call for a different response. He was one, in Llewellyn's formulation, 27 who felt a
pattern and "corrected" the concrete situation into comparison with
its appropriate working pattern, who saw which of the seen or felt
factors in it tended to dominance and what the movement-"strain"
was and whither that strain was leading or driving. He was one with
the situation-sense to apprehend that whatever the answer provided by
the traditional rule, the question presented by the sale of a mass-produced development house under a no-changes contract was a Henningsen kind of question.
24. Cavers, In Advocacy of the Problem Method, 43 COLUM. L. Rv. 449, 452

(1943).
25. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A. 2d 314 (1965).
26. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1960).
27. Supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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The approach of counsel for the plaintiff to this particular adjudication situation was skillful by any definition or standard. It was a
compound of thorough knowledge of rules and principles which might
apply, understanding of the interests and considerations that had produced those rules and principles and sensitivity to fact elements in the
immediate situation which would act persuasively on the tribunal
charged with making the choice. Quite clearly this kind of skillfulness
is not going to be given to young lawyers in a 10 or 12 week postgraduate skills course. The discouraging thing is that there frequently
prevails among teachers and lawyers alike the idea that this is something that cannot be taught at all, that this is something that will just
have to "come with experience." The position of the Arden House
group is that this waiting period while the young lawyer learns his
trade is a luxury the profession cannot afford. A Schipper case - a
complaint by the aggrieved purchaser of a modest development home is just the kind of case which might easily be brought to the young
and presumably modestly priced lawyer. If the young lawyer has
nothing to draw on but his formal training and if that training consists of a partial catalog of rules and principles fortified with a little
legal bibliography, his study of the problem would probably carry him
no farther than the traditional rule, and that is not far enough. Without purporting to prophesy on the future persuasive effect of Schipper the case is, of course, used merely as an illustration - one can say
that anyone in the position of Schipper deserves at least to have the
traditional rule re-examined in his case. It will not be so re-examined
unless his lawyer insists upon it, and his lawyer will not insist upon
it unless he is capable of the kind of mind-stretching effort that leads
him to arguments and alternatives drawn from all available sources of
principle and authority and leads him away from rule and principle
mechanically applied.
This, then, should be the focus of training lawyers for participation in the process of adjudication: mind-stretching, resourcefulness
and the discerning use of the raw materials of the law for the just and
orderly adjustment of competing social and personal interests. This is
the part of the whole process that cannot, at least in the foreseeable
future, be committed to cybernetics and advanced techniques of data
retrieval.2" Can this be taught? Professor Cavers argues compellingly
that this is the only thing that can be taught.
The problem of understanding legal materials is essentially one
of appreciating the significance they have for the lawyer when
he is seeking to resolve the various questions that he is called upon
to answer. What, in a given situation, may be the bearing of a
given case (or statute, contract, or theory) on a decision that the
lawyers must reach * * * The Philosophy of "So What" ?29

28. It is really no answer to point out, as is undoubtedly the case, that teachers
have been warning students for some time now about a "trend" toward decisions like
Schipper. The question is not whether a student has been warned of a specific possible
development, but whether he has come out of his education with a posture of mind that
equips him to anticipate any development in any field at any time.
29. Cavers, supra note 10, at 396.
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Learning acquired without regard to significance, he suggests, may
prove to be an over-simplified conception the young lawyer must unlearn before he can do a lawyer's job. 0
All of these factors take on even greater significance when we consider the problem of training lawyers for participation in the process
of legislation, "the rule-creating, structure-giving role." It is here that
the discussion of the relative places of knowledge, understanding and
skill becomes most confused and contradictory. Skills enthusiasts are
inclined to include negotiation and draftsmanship among the subjects
to be offered to law students on a how-to-do-it basis and to suggest
that a list of elementary or minimum skills would include such things
as How to Work Out an Estate Plan, How to Prepare and Probate
a Will, or How to Form, Operate and Dissolve a Corporation.8 1 The
suggestion fails to appreciate that negotiation and drafting are simply
coordinate parts of the process of legislation and completely beyond
the "skill" of one insufficiently trained to understand the rule-creating,
structure-giving character of what he is doing. It stresses technique
over thought and may leave the student with the unfortunate impression that what he should take out of his legal education is a book of
forms and a bag of tricks that he can thereafter employ uncritically
for the length of his professional life. Legislation is a far too subtle
and complex process for that.
On the other side, neither is schooling in rule and principle sufficient training for this difficult and increasingly important lawyer function. Conventionally, the student gets his rule and principle from appellate reports, from and in a litigation context. But the function of the
lawyer in such a setting and the impression the student gets of the
lawyer's part in the adjudication process is very different from what
it must be in the process of legislation. In contract adjudication, for
example, the emphasis in the first instance is on enforceability - on
definiteness and certainty and mutuality and the like. In matters of
interpretation it is the job of the lawyer to be purposeful and one-sided
in his reading and construction. In contract negotiating and drafting,
however, the lawyer may find that strict enforceability must be subordinated, as often as not, to the objective of obtaining a workable
arrangement. Purposeful one-sidedness is out of the question if the
situation is truly a negotiation as opposed to one of the various forms
of contracts of adhesion with which we are perhaps only too familiar.
Indeed, one of the most telling criticisms of young lawyers is that their
disproportionate absorption with adjudication has made them too contentious to carry out other lawyer functions effectively.82 Many lawyers
can testify that the young man (or the older one who has never learned
any better) unbendingly committed to getting an enforcable agreement protecting his client in all contingencies can be a nuisance at
the negotiating table.
This, however, is an essentially negative consideration, and it
is the positive demands of the process of legislation that need the most
30. Id. at 401.

31. Cantrall, Law Schools and the Layman: Is Legal Education Doing Its Job?,

38 A.B.A.J. 907 (1952).
32. Id. at 909.
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careful attention of those responsible for training young lawyers.
Consider the full meaning and implications of "rule-creating and structure-giving" in the negotiating and drafting of a long-term supply
contract for raw materials, a franchise agreement or a contract for
the design and installation of complex industrial equipment. Whereas
in an adjudication situation counsel can concentrate on a difficulty
which has arisen, here his job is to anticipate all those which may
arise and provide a workable scheme for their orderly resolution if
they do arise. He must coordinate the efforts and accommodate the
demands of technical men, financial men, marketing men and administrative men - on both sides of the table. He won't be expected to
have answers to technical, financial and marketing problems, but he
will be expected to ask the questions which will reveal the existence
or possibility of such problems and thus insure that they will be
provided for. He will prepare the first draft for everyone to shoot at,
and he will be the last to initial the final draft by which all interested
parties expect to live. He will be at the center of this process by which
private parties legislate a private legal system for the regulation of
certain of their rights and duties. He will be in that position because
that's the way it is in modern law practice. 3 His skill in planning
and negotiating a workable, practical arrangement which is also acceptable to the interested parties must be matched by his skill in reducing
the arrangement to clear, accurate prose that not only represents the
intentions of present interested persons but also will speak clearly and
unambiguously to other persons, not now present, months or even
years later. Such skill cannot be taught as a matter of legal mechanics.
It comes as the product of a capacity to absorb, comprehend, coordinate
and synthesize principle, factual data, and, above all, understanding of
what it is all this activity is designed to accomplish.
The demands on a lawyer's legislative capacities may be even
greater in activities such as will drafting, where representatives of
competing or potentially competing interests are not even present to
state and defend their own cases. Borrowing Professor Fuller's engaging figure, "Such a draftsman is not like a man playing solitaire, but
more like a player who plays in turn each of the hands in a bridge
game." 4 A lawyer is not performing the service his clients have a
right to expect if he thinks only in terms of producing something that
will pass muster in probate proceedings.
33.
The lawyer is today compelled to participate in decisions that represent a
synthesis of many factors, of which legal rules are often only a part, and sometimes a very subsidiary part. . . . Lawyers in private practice have put up a sort
of rear-guard action against making what they call "business decisions," but they
have lost the battle.
These decisions are not arrived at by the lawyer independently, but in consultation with men of different training, who bring to the conference table distinct
contributions that must somehow or other be fused into the final solution. Often,
the lawyer is the man who presides over that process of fusion. Here, then, is a
process into which he must be initiated and started off right in law school. He
must learn what is involved in deciding not what legally can be done, or what
action will be legally effective, but what should be done, all things considered,
when all points of view have been drawn into account.
Fuller, supra note 14, at 201.

34. Id. at 197.
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IV.
It bears repeating that one of the most important functions of
education for understanding is to impress upon students that lawyers
are "doers" and that one not trained to think in terms of doing is not
trained at all. Legal problems require solutions, not yes or no answers - even yes or no answers with reasons, blue-book style. A
client in trouble does not usually need a lawyer to tell him he is in
trouble, nor will he pay very handsomely for being told what he did
wrong and how he might have prevented the difficulty. What he is
looking for is someone to help him make repairs or salvage some of
the wreckage. A client told that "the law" prevents him from doing
what he wants to do is not usually prepared to drop the matter there;
he will want some help in determining what he can do, from someone
capable of understanding his needs and objectives and resourceful
enough to help him design and execute a proper method of satisfying
them. A student whose problem analysis has never gone beyond, "I
think the court should have . . ." or "The court held .

.

. and I agree

with the court" has no sense at all of the immediacy and urgency with
which legal problems present themselves to lawyers. What he needs,
and desperately, is some exposure to legal problems that come to him,
"Here is something that has to be done, and I have to do it."
This sense of urgency, this appreciation of legal problems as
something calling for thought and action on the part of the lawyer is
the quality that went out of legal training when law schools supplanted
law offices as the principal training ground. The present question is,
How can we recapture this quality without sacrificing the unquestioned
advantages of comprehensiveness, scholarly objectivity and perspective
which accompany (or should accompany) the university education of
lawyers? As Professor Walter Gellhorn of the Columbia Law School
has recently pointed out, law teachers have been exploring the uses
of "functional" legal education for more than thirty years.3 5 The
proposals have ranged from the stimulating but somewhat frightening
proposals of the late Judge Jerome Frank 6 that law schools build
their teaching around legal clinics to the more modest but still exciting
suggestions of Gellhorn17 and Llewellyn 8 that students be taught (or

35. Gellhorn, supra note 8.
36. Frank, Both Sides Against the Middle, 100 U. PA. L. Rev. 20 (1951).
37. No effort is made here to summarize Professor Gellhorn's comprehensive
program. For this writer the most interesting aspects are proposals for new and different text materials for second year students, books that would put a hard core of
subject matter before the students in an organized, systematic text form; texts which
would suggest questions as well as answers and provide materials for an attack on
such questions. Class time would be spent, not rehashing the text, but in working on
problems distributed to students in time for them to think about them and work them
out on their own. With this preparation third year students would be in a position
to pursue more intensive research and seminar work. Gellhorn, supra note 8.
38. Professor Llewellyn also was interested in developing texts which would
provide students with factual and historical and social information essential to understanding of the problems they are learning to deal with. Since this is the most
economical method for communicating information, the texts should free teaching
time for developing and consolidating what has been learned. See Llewellyn, On the
Problem of Teaching "Private" Law, 54 HARv. L. Rsv. 775 (1941); Llewellyn, supra
note 20.
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required to learn) fundamental information, then provided with an
opportunity to put it to use. Somewhere in between, perhaps, is the
Fuller-Cavers position that the effort to supply information without
direct, pointed and insistent reference to function is a defect not of
detail but of "basic orientation" in legal education. 9
Common to all of these proposals is what is usually referred to as
the problem method, the technique by which the student is thrust,
more or less cold, into the middle of a legal problem and asked to
provide a solution. At its most elaborate (and at its best) the student
is asked to do whatever solution of the problem requires - write a
memorandum of law, draft a contract or trust instrument, prepare a
will, etc. In so doing, of course, he will be required to acquaint himself and take account of pertinent case precedents, statutes, administrative regulations or even, conceivably, other relevant private instruments. It is a technique by which the student, hopefully, "learns law"
and at the same time acquires some skill in execution. Those who
see no occasion for large scale reforms in lawyer training protest that
except for the practice of skills provided by drafting, etc., this method
provides only what can be expected from conventional case method in
the hands of a duly and properly Socratic law teacher. The defect in
the argument is that it isn't true. The fact is that Christopher Columbus
Langdell might have difficulty recognizing his child in its present form.
Sad to relate, case method has been polished, perfected and institutionalized to a point where we have lost sight of the fact that,
It is not the judicial decision which is the essence of the "case";
it is instead the concrete problem-raisingsituation - so that, as
I see it, any introduction of the so-called "problem-method" into
law teaching is really but an expansion of the essential merits of
case-teaching, an expansion obscured only by a current misemphasis upon the idea of a "case" as being at best the official report
of a judicially decided cause."
Casebooks become fatter with every edition, and new editions seem to
come with increasing frequency. The fattening, as often as not, is in
the form of text-notes and note cases designed primarily to increase
the amount of knowledge and information pressed upon the students
until, in Professor Gellhorn's devastating description, "The swelling
resembles that of lungs threatened by suffocation. Students acquire
an over-stuffed feeling. They gag rather than swallow when more
nutriment is offered them."' What is worse, the emphasis continues
to be on answers or new answers or trends or developing new answers
with insufficient attention directed to the fact that usually it is the
questions that are new, new questions presented by problems evolving
39. Professor Fuller, in particular, urges that the focus of law teaching should
be on the two basic processes of adjudication and legislation; that there should be
concentration "on the major ways in which legislation and adjudication function in
our modern society, and let knowledge of rules become an unplanned by-product."
Fuller, supra note 14, at 197.
40. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis in Legal Education, 1 J. LWGAL ED. 211, 217

(1948).
41. Gellhorn, supra note 8, at 4.
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out of changed and changing circumstances. Every new casebook and
every new edition of an old one promptly produces its own group of
camp followers - the cans, cribs, briefs and purples (culminating in
that ultimate absurdity, the Teacher's Manual) 4 2 which could not,
repeat not, thrive in a system where the appellate report was used only
or principally as a "concrete problem-raising situation. ' 43 And semester after semester, year in and year out, teachers end up bitterly disappointed with the only tangible evidence they have of the fruits of
their efforts, a stack of mangled intelligence enclosed in blue covers.44
What to do?
There is force in the Gellhorn position that the first year curriculum, in general, needs relatively little tinkering, 4 although course
by course more work could be done on isolating fundamentals and
reducing instruction in details. But quite early in the second year,
casebook method begins to repeat itself unnecessarily and produce that
student boredom about which all teachers complain, while giving insufficient attention to who and what it is that is doing the boring. It is
here that problem work, "doing" work, should be introduced on as
large a scale as the resources of the school allow. A good deal of it is
being done now in specialized fields - taxation, estate planning, land
use - but the real profits are those that can be gained from problem
work designed, not to increase specialized knowledge, but to increase
full appreciation and understanding of the fundamental processes of the
legal system. (This is not to suggest that the specialized problem
courses, intelligently conducted, do not give students such appreciation and understanding. They do, without question.)
What follows is fragmentary and intended only to suggest the
kind of problem situations and problems that could supply the basic
training needed.
A. Contract Drafting. The starting point in all cases would be
acquainting the students with the aims and objectives of the parties;
42. The Teachers Manual for one of the leading Contracts casebooks has carried
the following caveat through at least two editions: "However, this outline is not a

treatise, and it cannot be used as a substitute for reading the cases and notes."

(Emphasis supplied.) When one considers that this Manual is jealously guarded and
made available only to those who have adopted the book - that this is a warning
directed not to students but to teachers - then one gets an uncomfortable feeling

that something must have gone wrong with the casebook method of teaching.
43. The reaction of some Maryland students to the introduction of the Uniform
Commercial Code provided a disheartening example of the thesis here stated. "Why",
they complained, "do we have to read pre-Code cases when they are not 'the law'
any longer? Why don't we just study the Code?" Never mind that they were
abysmally ignorant of the most elementary commercial transaction, to say nothing
of the kind of problems that might arise in such a setting, there was now new law
replacing old law and reading cases was just putting them to the unnecessary trouble
of learning old law. Deep into their second year, cases remained nothing more than
a peculiarly resistant form of subject matter.
44.
Every law teacher who has ever mentioned the matter to me has testified
to the depression of spirit, the black sense of discouragement, which assails him
when, each January and June, he sees his teaching mangled in the blue books. I
doubt that my informants can feel any worse than I do at these times.
Yet the grip of tradition is strong. We accept the stark mediocrity in performance to which our C and D grades testify as a sort of arithmetical necessity,
not as displaying the limitations of our casebook system.
Cavers, supra note 24, at 452.

45. Gellhorn, supra note 8, at 4.
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what each has that the other wants, some general idea of what each
is willing to give up in order to get from the other what he wants.
Then set them to work negotiating and drafting an arrangement which
will accomplish the respective objectives. All participants would work
on the same problems, though teaming or some other physical arrangements might be made as a matter of convenience. Initially, student
efforts may require a good deal of guidance and prodding from the
presiding teacher or teachers,4 6 but that would be a part of the learning.
1. Anyone familiar with Professor Fuller's handiwork as a casebook compiler will remember the "fish-glue" problem presenting a situation in which one party is in a position to supply the other with essential raw materials on very favorable terms if the other is prepared to
make a substantial necessary capital investment.4 7 The supplier fully
expects to have the raw materials available for an unlimited period, but
is unwilling to give an iron-clad guarantee to this effect. The planning,
negotiating and drafting of this agreement might readily provide a
whole semester's work for a contract drafting problem course. On just
the one phase of the problem referred to, the student would have to
educate himself on the uncertainties of lost profits and other business
losses as provable items of damage, the difficulties of planning a workable and enforceable liquidated damages clause in a complex contract
situation and the availability of flexible pricing techniques as a possible
legislative solution to the problems uncovered.
2. Planning and drafting a standard form of franchise agreement
for a manufacturer (of automobile parts or small appliances or soft
ice cream) who is relatively new and small in a highly competitive
market and who believes that dealer "loyalty" will be essential to his
success. If in his initial attack on the problem the student trips over
the antitrust laws, what better way to teach him that there is a lot of
law in the world and that not all legal problems wear labels on their
sleeves? This, of course, is also the classic situation for demonstrating
that workability and strict enforceability are not always compatible.
3. Planning, negotiating and drafting a separation agreement or
divorce settlement. At its center such a document is a piece of private
legislation used by private parties to substitute one legal relationship
for another. As much as the most complex commercial arrangement,
it requires thoughtful evaluation and analysis of the interests and needs
of principals, affected children and, if you will, the community in
general. It is rule-creating and structure-giving in its most meaningful
sense. If such things as tax problems enter in, fine! This may be one
of those golden, all too rare, opportunities to convince students that
there are some situations where even tax considerations should be subordinated to the purpose for which the agreement is to be made in
the first place.
4. Negotiating and drafting a collective bargaining agreement,
reproducing as nearly as possible a bargaining situation in which the
parties are working against the pressure of a threatened strike that
neither side wants. As Professor Fuller has pointed out, there is no
46. Who the teachers should be for this kind of work is discussed, infra, p. 293.
47. FULLnR & BRAUcHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 252 (1964).
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better problem setting for a demonstration that the processes of negotiating and drafting frequently make radically different demands, neither
of which can be acquired or even understood in the abstract, and neither
of which will come as a natural by-product of schooling in the principles of labor law."8
Construction contracts, employment contracts, sales contracts;
long term, short term, one shot - the possibilities are unlimited and
all in one way or another will provide some specific knowledge and
a lot of very broad, intensely usable insight and experience. What the
student gains from such exercises is easily transferable to planning and
drafting of other kinds of legislative instruments, not excluding statutes,
if the occasion arises. What he learns is dealing with a certain common
kind of lawyer problem from the front end - the shaggy, unlabeled,
frightening front end - and he learns it the only way he ever will,
by getting into it.
B. Commercial Transactions. No area of the law is better suited
for teaching the lesson that there are many things which the law
allows that must be thought of, planned and provided for at the proper
time or be lost for good. No area of the law is better suited for demonstrating that there may be several "legal" solutions to a problem but
that some of them may be ponderous, expensive and inefficient while
others are economical (of time and money) and appropriate.
1. There would be lessons upon lessons to be learned by students
required to plan and execute, in order, secured financing arrangements for:
a) A small, beginning manufacturer with a good idea and good
prospects but severely limited resources;
b) An established, well-heeled manufacturer who wants to add
to his heavy equipment without dipping into working
money;
c) An established manufacturer whose costs are primarily
labor and materials, whose capital investment is small and
who always operates on a tight margin.
2. There would be opportunities for some really imaginative work
on evolving financing techniques, such as the widening use of leasing
of equipment, vehicles and even real property.
3. In problems revolving around planning and negotiating
arrangements with and among creditors, there would be opportunities
to sharpen students' understanding of the process of adjudication in its
most comprehensive sense - the methods and techniques of adjustment of interests in those situations wherein the last thing anyone wants
is resort to legal sanctions.
C. Business Organization. The idea persists that creation, operation and dissolution of business organizations is something that can
be taught as sort of a standardized skill. As already noted, this approach
48. Fuller, supra note 14, at 196-97.
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overlooks the fact that these are basically legislative operations and
often tightly regulated legislative operations at that.
1. Perhaps the best way to show a student that organization of
a business is rule-creating and structure-giving is to start him off
planning and drafting a partnership agreement. Confronted with a
situation in which there is no limited liability for a shield, in which
partners' contributions may vary in kind as well as in value, and in
which contract principles and agency principles operate at nearly full
strength, the student will have to face the fact that there is no standard
form or all-purpose model he can lean on. He can be forced to think
out rights, duties, powers and liabilities in all contingencies and to
provide for them in clear and specific terms.
2. Problems that require a student to understand and make use of
stockholder suits, derivative suits and other assorted weaponry of intracorporate differences will also contribute to his understanding of the
fact that in many important respects the operation of any business
arrangement involves adjustment and reconciliation of competing interests of managers, employees and owners.
3. Problems of formation, "going public," dissolution and merger
can be used to demonstrate that the most careful attention to formal
requirements for such actions is no protection against Blue Sky, antitrust or tax disasters. More important, such work can help a student
appreciate for all professional purposes that he has not really thought
out any legal problem until he has shaken every bush and asked himself
all the critical questions.
D. Adjudication. Presumably, the law student's first exposure to
the process of adjudication comes in moot court. Presented with a prim
little statement of facts from which ambiguities have been rigorously excluded and in which all real questions of fact have been asked and answered, he is required to research, brief and argue an appeal. It is a most
useful exercise in research and writing, but it contributes very little to a
student's understanding of the process of adjudication. This is not a rap
at moot court. Exercises in research and writing are just what a first
year student needs as early as possible, and practice in synthesizing and
working up case and statute materials on his own, done conscientiously,
can inform and quicken all of his studies. If, however, his subsequent
advanced work with the process of adjudication proceeds from the same
kind of materials, then moot court training is simply being repeated, and
the student remains innocently unaware of the nagging, aching strains
that accompany almost any employment of the process of adjudication,
of the difference in demeanor of "facts" as they appear in an appellate
report and as they first present themselves to a lawyer,49 and of
49.
The isolation of a single phase of the adjudicative process from the process
as a whole not only leaves many things untaught, but distorts and falsifies what
it teaches. It conveys to the student almost no insight into the subtle issues involved in the proof of facts, for example. The appellate report usually presents
a parched skeleton of the facts which lawyers connected with the case sometimes
have difficulty recognizing as a description of the situation with which they
struggled for so many months. One of the permanent problems of the law and
of advocacy has to do with that most perilous of human operations; attempting
to transmit intact a set of facts from one human head to another. The appellate-
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"the tension that always exists between paper rules and the actual
administration of justice."50
1. Professor Fuller suggests that training for understanding of
the function of adjudication should start with the simplest known
process designed for that purpose, the process of arbitration.5 1 More or
less free of rules of procedure and evidence or rules of substantive law
that demand observance, participants in the process of arbitration can
focus without apology on the purpose for which any adjudication is
intended - reconciliation of opposed interests. Acting on this suggestion, problem work designed for understanding of the process of adjudication might start with the simplest arbitration problem:
a) Commercial arbitration of a dispute arising out of non-performance of a contract; non-performance prompted at least
in part by a severe, unexpected turn of the market. The
problem would be a completely individual one in that the
award would affect only the disputants.
b) The next step up might be arbitration of a grievance under
a collective bargaining agreement wherein the solution may
be expected to produce radiations, however unofficial and
non-authoritative, affecting subsequent action on similar
grievance claims.
c) The Fuller proposal would include such elements as an arbitrator who goes beyond the terms of the submission and
decides issues not presented by the parties, or who makes
independent fact investigations out of the presence of the
parties. Forcing the student to consider the propriety of
such actions by an adjudicator in a simplified adjudication
setting will contribute to his "fundamental insight into the
purpose of pleadings" in the first case and his "fundamental
52
insight into the whole adversary system" in the second.
2. It is extremely difficult to reproduce a trial situation artificially,
particularly a trial situation which rests heavily on oral testimony. It is
difficult because it requires enormous expenditure of time and resources
to create a trial situation that puts the student to work investigating,
analyzing, cross-checking and preparing the data which make up the
facts of any adjudication problem. The question is, however, whether
the expenditure should not be made if students are to learn that "facts"
in a case are the work-product of lawyers. Even a small school should
think about making a start on training for the kind of problem analysis
required of lawyers in this, the most important and sensitive stage of
case method gives little inkling of the existence of that problem, much less any
understanding of the measures that may be taken toward solving it. Id. at 193.
50. Id. at 196.
51. Id. at 198. To avoid over-simplifying and thus mistating Professor Fuller's
suggestions, it must be pointed out again that his plan contemplates a change in the
basic orientation of formal legal education. In his scheme arbitration problems would
lead off the course on introductory procedure, so that all subsequent study of procedure would build on this understanding of the function of the process of adjudication.
52. Id. at 199. See note 51 supra.
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conventional litigation. There are exercises in analysis of adjudication
problems that can be undertaken even while the small school plans a
deployment of resources that will provide experience in the trial process.
a) The practical difficulties of manufacturing a trial situation
can be minimized where the evidence is predominantly
documentary.
b) The difficulty of providing opportunities for students to
question witnesses does not prevent exercises in preparation
of interrogatories or depositions. Here, at least, are exercises requiring the student to think through the information
he will need for the prosecution of his case, the questions
he must ask to get that information, the rules and procedures that control and limit his ability to get such information and the formulation of questions designed to
bring the most useful responses.
c) In this day of streamlined pleading a lawyer must be capable
of using every available source of needed or useful information. Reconstruction of an opponent's case from a subpoena
duces tecum or motion for an order to produce documents
and records can be a useful and practical exercise in problem analysis.
d) Litigation problems of this character may be the instruments by which students are finally persuaded that remedy
is not an afterthought. The client suffering crippling unfair competition is little cheered by an award of damages
after he has been run out of business. Nominal damages
rarely inspire generous impulses in contract clients. But
casebook cum bluebook pedagogy cannot be relied upon to
convince students that cause and remedy are one and, for
the client, the remedy is the one."
3. Little remains to be said about training for understanding of
the appellate stage of the adjudication process, except this: Appeals are
planned and briefs written not from pre-fabricated fact statements but
from records. Yet many young lawyers who have spent most of their
formal education looking at one piece or another of the appellate process
still come into the profession without ever having seen, let alone worked
with, a record - in all of its usually untidy grandeur.
It is necessary to repeat the disclaimer entered a few pages back.
The preceding general description of problem courses and problems is
certainly not exhaustive. It is intended to suggest and describe an
objective: The objective of providing an educational setting in which
53. Where Practice Court machinery already exists, a vehicle, properly augmented, is available for expansion of student experience with all stages of the
adjudication process. For a description of the Michigan effort to give students a
coherent experience in investigating, preparing, pleading, trying and appealing a
single case problem, see Joiner, Legal Education: Extent to Which "Know-I-ow"

in Practice Should Be Taught in Law Schools, 6 J.

LEGAL ED.

295 (1954).
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a student can build his own understanding that the law is not a thing
but a process, a process for the orderly adjustment of divergent interests, in which the lawyer is a central and responsible actor.
V.
Even among believers the idea persists that intensive problem work
is a luxury item that can be offered on a large scale only by the big
schools with their seemingly unlimited resources." 4 While it is probably true that a large scale problem program is beyond the resources
of a school with a 10 to 15 man faculty, it is not beyond the combined
resources of such a school plus the bar it serves. It is the educational
talent and resources of lawyers and law offices that have been misspent
or disregarded since the law schools took over formal legal training.
A problem program will require manpower. Groups of 10 to 15
students seems to be a maximum for this kind of work. Where can
the small or middle-sized school find it? First of all, in the University
of Maryland catalog for 1965-66, there are at least ten elective courses
that could be offered in alternate years without serious loss or dislocation." Here is a supply of ten teachers who in the off years could take
part in problem work. If each participating full-time teacher was
teamed with an experienced, interested practicing lawyer, the result
could be a teaching combination capable of the best of both worlds.
The teacher presumably knows the students, what they have brought
with them into law school, their most critical weaknesses, the best ways
to build and exploit their strengths. The lawyer, on the other hand,
knows what demands will be made on them in practice, which weaknesses will be most costly, what are the common sins of beginning
lawyers. The teacher can bring to the work the habits of detached and
objective inquiry vital to truly professional education. The lawyer can
guard against the overdose of detachment that often obscures the fact
that the law and lawyers are parts of a working system. It is clear,
of course, that the lawyer member of the team cannot be the amiable
practitioner who drops in weekly, if the exigencies of his practice permit, to give students the benefit of comments, observations and reminiscences off the seat of his pants. He must be engaged as a faculty
member at a respectable stipend to share equally the job of designing,
planning and preparing problems, of conducting class working sessions,
and of reading, evaluating and commenting on the work product. The
lawyer member should bring with him the same attitude he would
assume toward a younger associate in his office, and he should be
encouraged to bring with him problems he has on his desk if he and
his teacher colleague agree that they serve the educational purposes
of the work. The lawyer and the teacher together should be able to
discern and anticipate problems that are just arising or perhaps just
54. Professor Gellhorn reports that at Columbia, for example, second and third
year students in the year 1963-64 could choose from 38 courses and 50 seminars.
Gellhorn, supra note 8, at 2.
55. Accounting, Admiralty, Domestic Relations, Equitable Remedies, International Law, Labor Law, Legal History, Patents, etc., Real Estate Transactions,
Trade Regulation.
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out of sight, and thus introduce the excitement of creative studentteacher-lawyer collaboration in unsettled and unexplored areas.
The suggestion that wider use be made of the teaching talents of
practicing lawyers sometimes brings apprehensive noises from the
teaching fraternity. In that connection Professor Cavers' observations
are in point.
The disappointments which have generally attended the part-time
employment of the practicing lawyer in law teaching have typically
resulted from the fact that he was not put to work for which his
experience had suited him. As adviser and critic of students
who are attacking problems of the sort with which the lawyer
daily deals, he can add values which the professional law teacher
cannot well be expected to contribute. 6
In addition to manpower the comprehensive problem program
needs working materials. Here, too, the school needs the active and
extensive cooperation of the profession. One of the big shortcomings
of problem work as presently conducted is that the problems, like moot
course cases and examination questions, must be manufactured. As
often as not this is done by a sort of mugwump process by which the
teacher decides where he wants the students to end up and then builds
something like a treasure hunt to get them there. The result frequently
is something entirely too chaste to give students an accurate picture
of the appearance and form of genuine legal problems. What is needed
are real problems made up of real correspondence, real office memos,
real contracts, real balance sheets, real technical bulletins, real cost
analyses, real expense account sheets, real transcripts and records as in each case may be appropriate - all in original form or as close
to it as possible. Students are told that they must learn to think, talk
and write like lawyers. They are never made fully aware that they
must learn to read like lawyers, too, and that most of a lawyer's reading
matter comes not in appellate reports but in an astounding assortment
of miscellaneous documents, much of it badly written and intended for
some purpose entirely different from that for which it has become
important.
The school's plea to the bar will have to be, Let us in on your
problems. Let us use your files where that can be done without endangering confidential relations or sensitive materials. Old closed files
are frequently as good as fresh active ones for this purpose. If a law
office has a file that would make a good problem, perhaps it can at
least advise the school of its existence, leaving it to the problem course
teachers to negotiate its use with the affected clients. Materials made
available in such cases can usually be amended or disguised so that no
one need be injured. With the help of the bar many viable problems
can be constructed without any danger at all to client relations; problems can be built around standard forms used by banks and other
financing institutions if those forms are made available and some
assistance in problem preparation is given by those who know what
56. Cavers, supra note 24, at 459.
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the problems are. In this kind of transaction a fictitious problem may
still be a perfectly sound one. Karl N. Llewellyn, a man endowed
with unique powers of persuasion, reportedly was successful at both
Columbia and Chicago in borrowing transcripts and records for his
students to use in briefing and arguing appeals. There seems no reason
why these cannot be made available for teaching purposes. In some
cases, what may be needed is an introduction to the client. In a contract drafting problem, for example, involving the sale of a possibly
hazardous substance, students might be expected to develop questions
about packaging, storing, transporting, etc. If so, they would need
access to someone who can answer the questions. There are undoubtedly
many ways in which the bar can aid and inform such a program.
Initially such activities would call for substantial efforts by members
of the bar as well as school personnel, but once a decent inventory of
problems is built up, it can be kept current with relatively modest
increments. The first step is for the bar to take an interest and acknowledge that the profession has a stake in legal education.
VI.
There is another reason for urging this program so strongly, a
reason included with some hesitation: Teachers need it. Putting aside
the old chestnut that those who can't make it in practice turn to teaching, it does appear to be true that many devoted and able teachers come
to the classroom after discovering to their vast disappointment that
they just don't like practice. To the extent that teaching represents a
flight from the unlovely aspects of law practice, there is sometimes
an inclination to remove oneself as far as practicable from that activity.
Teachers can't afford to do that. As Professor Cavers has intimated,
teachers cannot claim that they teach students to "think like lawyers"
while denying themselves opportunities to see how lawyers think, or
what changes may be occurring in the way lawyers think.17 The danger
is too much insulation. Lawyers, in common with prize-fighters and
demolition experts, enjoy the advantage of prompt notice of professional shortcomings. A teacher, however, is so well protected against
the consequences of his failures that opportunities for self-deception
are always present. The danger is magnified when the teaching method
becomes as stylized as casebook method has in many instances. Brisk
Socratic dialogue between a bright third year student and an experienced teacher may prove that both understand the subject, or it may
just prove that they understand each other. Out of school, the young
lawyer soon discovers that lawyers don't continue to talk this language
for very long and clients, of course, never did. Teachers, on the other
hand, frequently miss this variety of experience and need reminding
that they are training professionals who must function in the climate
of law office and courtroom, not classroom. Team problem teaching
as here proposed may provide a vehicle for communion with the bar
which for the teacher can bring sharpened awareness of how the law
is moving and what professional demands it will make on its initiates.
57. Cavers, supra note 10, at 395, n.1.
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A teacher cannot afford to think of himself solely as a teacher whose
subject happens to be law. He must also be a lawyer whose principal
professional duty is the training of other lawyers.
Ideally, a comprehensive problem program would permit every
faculty member to take part at least once every two years. More ideally
(if such a condition is possible) each faculty member would undertake
problem work in fields about which he knows as little as possible;
contracts men dealing with problems of procedure, public law men
wrestling with the intricacies of real property problems and so on. If
this sounds like the lame leading the halt, it shouldn't be. What a good
lawyer brings to any problem, familiar or unfamiliar, is primarily
his situation-sense, his feel for the way the legal system functions.
Problem work offers an opportunity for the teacher to keep his own
situation-sense tuned up.
Finally, problem work provides the faculty with a check on itself.
If teachers believe they can separate the lawyers from those who don't
have it in the super-heated and contrived circumstances of an examination, how much more successfully must they be able to make that
judgment in a setting where the student can extend himself, proceed
at his own pace and compensate for lack of natural talent with greater
effort. What is even more, in such work there would be an opportunity to try corrective measures rather than relying exclusively on
the axe. It might be refreshing to experiment with guiding a student's
efforts at working up understanding and skill, as opposed to offering
him a single three hour shot at proving himself or "off with his head !"
VII.
What can a post-graduate short course, such as that proposed by
the Arden House Conference, add to the education and training
program described? In the first place "skills" or "skillfulness" may
be the wrong words to indicate the objectives of this additional training. It may be more to the point at this stage to concentrate on making
the recent graduate a reasonably knowledgable member of the profession, one who can function with a fair measure of efficiency. Until the
young lawyer has acquired an elementary familiarity with the routines
of the legal process, he will waste time and effort with resulting loss
to him and his clients. There is, therefore, nothing mean or disreputable about an effort to introduce him to the courthouse, the zoning
commission, the liquor board and the workmen's compensation commission. He can act not only more quickly but with greater confidence
if he knows what forms he must use, where and with whom he is to
file them and when. He can deal more intelligently with his clients
if he knows how the various agencies of the legal system operate and
how long it takes them to process a matter.
Secondly, the short course can supply short, intensely practical
exercises or drills in doing what legal education, hopefully, has taught
needs doing in specific situations. If the young lawyer's education has
taught him fact analysis and evaluation in a dispute situation, the short
course can supply drill in combining substance with procedural rule
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and proper form to start the legal machinery operating in a simple
negligence case, a simple contract case, a simple compensation case, etc.
The emphasis is on the "simple." At this stage, if the fact situations
are made too complex, there is a temptation to slide into broad review
of substantive law and sharp focus on functioning may be lost. There
are other kinds of lawyer activities in which the short course can add
drill in the practical routines of doing to the understanding that law
school education is to provide. If law school has given training in the
essentially legislative character of will drafting, the short course can
offer a refresher in statutory requirements for validity and, in addition,
drill in the mechanics and formalities of probate and administration.
To law school training in the legislative character of organization of
a business, the short course can again add refreshers and drill in satisfying the formal statutory requirements of such activities. Other subjects roughly grouped in this class might be presented almost entirely
as a matter of mechanics: How to attach a mechanic's lien; how to
foreclose a mortgage; how to have a client released on bail; how to
institute post-conviction proceedings; how to commence (or resist)
an eviction proceeding, etc.
The third broad grouping of subjects in the short course can be
aimed at providing a comprehensive view of the shape and substance
of certain common proceedings. These subjects in many instances might
be presented in a combination of relatively economical teaching techniques, including extensive prepared materials for outside reading plus
demonstrations, followed perhaps by simple problem exercises to test
comprehension. Domestic matters seem susceptible to such treatment
(uncontested and contested divorce proceedings, desertion and support
cases, custody cases), as well as simple bankruptcy proceedings, small
claims matters and proceedings before magistrates. Also in this group
might be included some essentially legislative activities such as the
purchase and sale of a small business and real estate closings. To the
extent that these last mentioned involve the unavoidable combination
of legal advice and business advice, it may be that the best thing the
short course can do is introduce the technique of the checklist, complete with models, to reinforce the young lawyer's understanding that
he must ask the questions.
Finally, there are some matters in which the short course can and
will operate primarily as a check on education. For example, "How
to search a title" may provide a small exercise in mechanics but not
a very illuminating one if the young lawyer doesn't understand what
he is searching for in the first place. What it can do is reveal
deficiencies that will have to be corrected before a client can be served
properly. It can show the subject what he doesn't know. Indeed, this
kind of side effect may appear throughout the exercises of the short
course and, for a conscientious student, be one of the most important
benefits of the program. If he is well educated and trained, he can fill
gaps without difficulty. If he is not well educated and trained, he won't
know a gap when he sees one.
It is obvious that planning such a short course must be undertaken principally by the practicing rather than the academic side of the
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profession. It is possible, however, that the lawyers and teachers who
contribute to a well conceived problem program in a law school will
emerge from that experience well equipped to contribute as well to this
final stage of formal training for the profession. There is no doubt that
an enormous expenditure of time and effort will be required to prepare
materials and provide talent for such a program. It will be costly but
not impossible. It is the position of the Arden House Report that this
is an expenditure a learned and responsible profession must be prepared to make.
VIII.
It bears repeating that there need be nothing narrow or earthbound about the over-all scheme proposed. It is true that nothing is
worse for the profession and the society it serves than toleration of
educational processes that offer vocational training rather than professional education. But this is not what is proposed. Functional training
in law school and after is designed for and can give meaning to learning through awareness that rules and principles operate in a setting
of palpable expectations and disappointments, genuine pain and deprivation. If, as appears to be true, the most persistent complaint against
the profession is that of client neglect, then this would seem to be a
critical problem of professional responsibility. It may be that the way
to attack this problem is never to let our new members forget, from
their first year in law school, that the practice of law is not just an
interesting and sometimes profitable way to earn a living, but a commitment to assume responsibility for the lives, liberty and property of
members of the community, and that mistakes, indifference and carelessness can hurt people.5 s
Beyond that, there is reason to believe that functional training
contributes to the development of professional pride. A well executed
memorandum of law or moot court brief, accompanied by commentaries recognizing its excellence, are a source of pride and satisfaction
even to a beginning law student far exceeding what he gets from a
letter or number grade on a transcript. A sense of professional pride
or even professional fastidiousness is likely a better stimulus to responsible professional performance than the most eloquent exhortations.
Whenever I write or talk about this subject, I recall a young
man, a graduate of one of the best law schools, who entered a
58. In September, 1965, after this article was substantially completed, the writer
was privileged to attend the Asheville Conference of Law School Deans on Education
for Professional Responsibility as Dean Cunningham's representative. The stimulating discussions enjoyed on that occasion suggested the possibility that this article
might be expanded to include consideration of the ways in which law school participation in programs sponsored by the Office of Economic Opportunity, for example, might
supply some of the needed functional training. This temptation has been resisted
for two reasons. First, while there is ample reason to believe that "Poverty Program"
work by law students may contribute significantly to a student's sense of professional
obligation to the community, there is also reason to believe that the training value
of such work may be limited. Second, law schools must remain responsible for insuring that the educational program serves its full function. Law schools must be wary
of regarding defender projects, neighborhood law office projects and the like as convenient surrogates for the practical or functional training of law students.
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New York City law firm when I did a decade and a half ago. He
was asked in connection with a massive antitrust proceeding, to
prepare a memorandum on the significance of a large group of contracts for the sale of "bunkers." He prepared a splendid looking
document noting every subtlety of language and attending to
every apparent digression from usual terms. But the first question the partner in charge asked him was "What's a bunker?",
and the young man didn't know. He didn't last long - he suffered
the indignity of being fired from his first job inside of a couple
of months. It seemed he just couldn't learn, or learn fast enough,
to ask himself those questions before someone else did. In a sad
sort of way my young colleague for such a brief time represents
the objective I am urging here - a program of professionaleducation that doesn't produce graduateswho don't know enough to ask
themselves, "What's a bunker"?

